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Most of the history of the Baltic States in the 20th century is completely dominated by their relation to the Eastern giant, the Soviet Union. What the Soviet Union represented was not only an authoritarian, and at times, totalitarian rulership but also a constant fear of the unpredictable. Two French military historians, connected with the journal Guerre et Histoire, have recently managed to go through newly opened archives in Russia to unveil the unpredictable career of the most distinguished commander of the Red Army, Gregory Zhukov. Their book entirely confirms the impression among Baltic people that the Soviet Union was fundamentally instable in the sense that anything could happen: state arbitrariness.
The research methodology employed in this biography of Zhukov is a novelty, as the French scholars have refrained from using the many memoires written by the participants of Operation Barbarossa. Instead, they rely upon so-called primary sources to show how all the memoir writers, including Zhukov, deviated from the truth in one way or another in order to tell self-flattering stories. The result is a brilliant analysis of how the Soviet state operated in its most important section, defence. It is also very interesting because it analyses strategies employed by both sides, not only by the Red Army but also by Wehrmacht Ostheer.
The findings from this in-depth analysis of Zhukov's life -a real roller coaster -include the following points: I. Soviet Unpredictability : A modern state cannot operate, in the long run, on systematic falsehoods or with sudden changes of truth to falsehood and vice versa. Zhukov possessed a never-ending loyalty to the Soviet Union, but he had to fight constantly for the truth in combat, and afterwards in his personal life. When his early and much praised contributions to the Red Army were completely denied by Khrushchev and Brezhnev, he could no longer take it and died a bitter man.
The immense Red Army was typical of other Soviet bureaucracies. The Red Army was based upon the ever-present threat of false accusations. The secret police and the party could accuse anybody, from the ordinary man to the highest officials. As an honour, Zhukov was offered a white horse at the Red Square in 1945, when final victory was saluted. Later, however, this fact would be an important piece in the evidence against him when he was JAN-ERIK LANE, University of Geneve, janeklane@gmail.com. accused of promoting "bonapartism", a military coup against the party. Khrushchev used the enormous attack on Zhukov as a tool in his policy of de-Stalinisation.
The logic of the Soviet State was crystal clear: Stay away from the doings of the secret police if possible because tomorrow you could be its victim, especially if it changes its head suddenly. Not one of Zhukov's generals or wartime collaborators helped him in any way. Some of them had been effectively silenced.
II. The ever-present fear of Stalin: Following Max Weber, one may wish to underline that the essence of the modern state is civil and military bureaucracy. State efficiency is only possible if there are rational means and ends, and predictability in the application of rules. In the story of Zhukov's life, from its beginnings to its end, the Soviet state, due to Stalin's almost 30 years of rule, failed to fulfil these elementary requirements of predictability, and rational means and ends.
Zhukov actually ended up in the purge twice, but managed to come back. The more Stalin's health deteriorated, the worse the situation became, with a generalised fear of the leader among all officials. Despite the purges, the 100 per cent loyalty to Stalin remained. Zhukov did not hesitate to serve despite the assassination of the brilliant Marshal Tukhachevsky, or the torture of Rokossovsky, who would later prove to be a highly skilled general. Wherein lay the charisma of Stalin? Despite a complete lack of military training, he was the chief commander, playing the top generals against each other -maximising fear.
III. The Saviour: The Soviet state left behind two opposing evaluations of Zhukov's accomplishments and competence. Lopez and Otkhmezuri argue convincingly that only by examining the primary source can a true evaluation of Zhukov be made. They favour the first evaluation, but not without some new and important reservations.
Zhukov made more mistakes than he later admitted and did not appreciate his colleagues in the field enough. The hero of Stalingrad was Chuikov, who at night reclaimed what the Germans had captured during the day. Zhukov was involved in the great disaster of the Kiev Kessel early in the war. But he played a decisive role in holding Leningrad and defending Moscow in 1941. Perhaps he was the first in the Stavka to realise that the Ostheer was already exhausted after the stunning success at Kiev. Moreover, Zhukov also displayed skills in offensive tactics and strategy, at Kursk in 1943, at Bagration in 1944 and at the VistulaOder Operation of 1945. Yet he was clearly defeated by Model in 1942 and he was hardly the conqueror of Berlin as Konev advanced more quickly.
The two French scholars add some interesting reflections on the reasons for the German defeat and the destruction of its Ostheer. If the two chief contenders were Hitler and Zhukov, then the latter had the advantage of a limited theoretical education at a military academy, whereas Hitler was a born amateur. Zhukov compensated for his short training by reading military history and analysing situations in depth as they evolved, especially Stavka's losses and mistakes.
